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Resumo
Os Dilemas Estratégicos Europeus
O lento progresso no domínio da cooperação mili-
tar reflete um problema mais profundo: a ausência 
de uma cultura estratégica europeia partilhada. 
Paralelamente, a presença de constrangimentos 
em matéria de recursos imprime à Europa uma 
maior urgência para cooperar. Na última década, 
o ambiente no qual a Europa opera mudou radical-
mente – mudança esta que a Europa não conseguiu 
acompanhar. A evolução dos acontecimentos veio 
comprometer os pressupostos nos quais a Estraté-
gia Europeia de Segurança, acordada em 2003, se 
baseou. Os europeus carecem de uma nova estra-
tégia global, necessitando de fazer escolhas sobre 
o nível a que pretendem influenciar e como. Uma 
ilustração da tendência europeia para evitar reali-
zar escolhas complexas reside no conceito de “par-
cerias estratégicas” – o quadro europeu de referên-
cia conceptual de relacionamento com potências 
líderes no século XXI. Se algo resta da aspiração da 
UE para se afirmar como “potência normativa” este 
conceito deve refletir uma distinção de política ex-
terna entre democracias e não-democracias.
Abstract
The slow pace of progress in military co-operation reflec-
ts a deeper problem: the lack of a shared strategic culture 
in Europe. At the same time, resource constraints make 
it even more urgent than before for them to co-operate. 
Meanwhile, in the last decade the environment in which 
Europe operates has dramatically changed – and Europe 
has failed to catch up. In particular, developments have 
undermined six of the assumptions on which the first 
European Security Strategy (ESS), agreed in 2003, was 
based. Europeans therefore urgently need a new global 
strategy. They will need to make tough choices about 
where in the world they want to have influence and how. 
One striking illustration of Europe’s tendency to avoid 
making such difficult choices is the concept of “strategic 
partnerships” – the EU’s key conceptual framework for 
its relations with the leading powers of the twenty-first 
century. If anything is to remain of the EU’s aspiration 
to be a “normative power”, it must distinguish in its fo-







At the European Council in December 2013, European leaders discussed defence 
for the first time since the euro crisis began in 2010. They agreed to fill capabili-
ty gaps revealed by the 2011 military intervention in Libya (in particular “strate-
gic enablers” such as drones, air-to-air refueling and satellite communication), to 
improve the co-ordination of defence planning and procurement, and to enhance 
the role of the European Commission on research on dual-use technologies1. They 
also agreed to discuss defence again – and in particular to assess progress on what 
was agreed in December – in June 2015. In this sense, the summit was “a modest 
success” (Witney, 2013). But even these baby steps towards greater European cohe-
rence were on defence infrastructure rather than on actual military co-operation, 
where Europeans continue to make even slower progress.
The slow pace of progress in military co-operation reflects a deeper problem: the 
lack of a shared strategic culture in Europe. Nearly all EU member states have 
published some sort of national strategic document in the last decade. But a re-
view of these documents by Olivier de France and Nick Witney (2013) showed a 
“cacophony” rather than a shared strategic culture. The basic problem is that Eu-
ropeans disagree profoundly among themselves about what armed forces are for 
and when and how military force should be used. But without a common answer 
to these questions, it is difficult to decide what capabilities Europeans collectively 
need and on what basis they should take decisions about “pooling and sharing” 
– the initiative to integrate European military capabilities launched in 2010. In the 
absence of such a shared strategic understanding, decisions are taken on an ad 
hoc basis.
A striking illustration of the problem is the way defence cuts have been made since 
the crisis began. Nick Witney wrote in 2011 that such cuts had been made “strictly 
on a national basis, without any attempt at consultation or co-ordination within 
either NATO or the EU, and with no regard to the overall defence capability which 
will result from the sum of these national decisions.” He went on to say that “such 
autism suggests a fundamental lack of regard for any wider strategic context – and 
recalls the longstanding concerns about how much of European defence spending 
is wasted through unnecessary duplication, or through the pursuit of objectives 
that have little to do with the primary aim of equipping and supporting effective 
armed forces”(Witney, 2011).
Thus Europeans face two related problems. Firstly, there is a lack of a shared strategic 
culture in Europe that makes it difficult for member states to co-operate. Secondly, 
however, resource constraints make it even more urgent than before for them to co
-operate. As other powers beyond Europe overtake them in terms of defence spen-
1  On the December European Council, see Biscop and Coelmont (2013).
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ding, they now face a choice of pooling what capabilities they have – or losing them. 
These two problems alone make it necessary for Europeans to agree a global or grand 
strategy as the basis for a coherent, effective foreign policy. But there is also a third 
problem that makes it even more urgent for Europeans to agree such a strategy: in 
the last decade the environment in which Europe operates has dramatically changed 
– and, in part because of the first two problems, Europe has failed to catch up. 
A New Global Environment
It is now a decade since European leaders, searching for common ground after the 
Iraq debacle, approved a European Security Strategy (ESS), which was prepared 
by the then High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier 
Solana (Council of the European Union, 2003). Produced in the heyday of Europe’s 
post-Cold War confidence, it began with the memorable statement that “Europe 
has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free”. But Europe and its environ-
ment have changed dramatically in the last decade – not least since Europe was 
engulfed by the eurozone crisis in 2010. As a result, many of the approaches that 
worked well for Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War now look so-
mewhat outdated. In particular, developments in the last decade have undermined 
six of the assumptions on which the ESS was based.
First, much of Europe’s approach to its neighbourhood was based on the use of soft 
power. In the era of enlargement, the EU was able to use the appeal of membership 
to shape the policies of its near neighbours in central and south-eastern Europe. 
It can still occasionally apply this type of leverage with a handful of countries in 
the Western Balkans such as Serbia. The promise of closer ties to the EU may still 
have an impact on some other countries in the post-Soviet space such as Moldova, 
though recent events in Ukraine suggest even there Europe’s power of attraction is 
waning. Meanwhile the EU has struggled to gain any comparable leverage over its 
neighbours in North Africa and the Middle East. Thus the EU needs to think about 
how its values can best be promoted at a time when it has lost its power of attrac-
tion and faces soft power competition in its neighbourhood. 
Second, the EU has also had to recognise the limitations of its financial tools for 
shaping other societies – in particular aid. EU member states pride themselves 
on being collectively the world’s greatest donors of development aid and remain 
willing to use economic access to the EU as a political tool. But although the EU still 
has some economic leverage over some of its eastern neighbours, it has much less 
in the Middle East and North Africa. Against the background of the crisis, member 
states have made big cuts in development aid. Even when the EU tries to use its aid 
and remaining economic strength to achieve explicitly political goals, other big-s-
pending actors are able to undermine it. Whatever the moral and economic case for 
aid, it offers European governments diminishing political returns.
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Third, “effective multilateralism” – the central concept in the ESS – is becoming 
harder to achieve in a neo-Westphalian world. Since 2003, Europeans have sought 
“effective multilateralism” above all through the United Nations but also interna-
tional financial institutions such as the World Trade Organisation. But Europeans 
have been increasingly frustrated by the readiness of rising powers to use the UN 
and other global institutions as a means to counter Western ambitions. Non-Wes-
tern powers have increasingly blocked initiatives on human rights in the General 
Assembly and Human Rights Council, and China and Russia have refused to co
-operate on a series of first-order crises such as Syria. There has also been a global 
shift away from the idea of a “responsibility to protect” since the intervention in 
Libya. The EU should not give up on its multilateralist aspirations, but it may need 
to use other forums and find other ways to legitimate the use of force than the UN 
Security Council.
Fourth, the prolonged economic crisis has exacerbated cutbacks in military spen-
ding and led to an erosion of European military capabilities, which has undermi-
ned Europe’s ability to deploy military force. Major sustained engagement such as 
many member states undertook in Afghanistan and Iraq in the previous decade is 
inconceivable in the foreseeable future and it is even doubtful whether Europeans 
will even be able to undertake short, sharp interventions such as those in Libya 
and Mali. On top of the cuts in spending that have reduced capabilities, European 
populations also seem to be increasingly reluctant to back an interventionist foreign 
policy involving the use of military force. European leaders will therefore have to 
think hard about alternative instruments for securing their increasingly unstable 
neighbourhood and about how to co-operate with other partners such as the Afri-
can Union when military interventions are absolutely necessary.
Fifth, the Transatlantic relationship is changing as the US cuts its own defence bu-
dget and “rebalances” towards Asia. Under President Barack Obama, the US is al-
ready taking a low-cost approach to leadership2. This means that, at a time when 
Europeans are themselves under greater pressure than ever before, they will be 
expected to take more responsibility for sorting out problems in their own nei-
ghbourhood. American readiness to join Europeans in confronting problems that 
is increasingly sees as primarily European rather than American concerns will de-
pend upon whether it detects any greater willingness on Europe’s part to put more 
into NATO, and to fend for itself where it reasonably can. Europeans will therefore 
have develop their own capabilities and, in particular, the “strategic enablers” they 
will need to manage crises in their own backyard – and which the US was forced to 
supply in the Libya campaign. 
2  See Mandelbaum (2010).
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Sixth, the emergence of Asia as the new fulcrum of international politics will have 
huge implications for Europeans. Even as tensions have increased in East Asia, Eu-
ropeans have “mainly tended to seek markets rather than enemies” in the region 
(Keohane, 2012: 46). But it is short sighted for Europeans to view Asia through 
an economic prism alone. It is highly improbable that any confrontation between 
China and the US would involve any direct European participation, though France 
insists that it has a “strategic stake” in the Asia-Pacific and the UK would presu-
mably be indirectly implicated with the US in any conflict due to their intelligence 
partnership3. But Europeans would have to take some sort of political stance and 
it is conceivable that they could split over how to respond, which would be disas-
trous internally. Alternatively, they might collectively adopt a position of nervous 
neutralism, which would have huge implications for the transatlantic relationship4.
Difficult Choices
Since the end of World War II, Europeans have lived in a world of institutions sha-
ped by them and their allies. But unless they update their strategic thinking, they 
will likely find themselves the object of global developments in the coming decades 
rather than able to shape them. In the process of such a strategic rethink, Europeans 
will need to make tough choices about where in the world they want to have in-
fluence and how. The shift in the global distribution of power from west to east 
and shrinking political and military resources mean that the time has passed, if it 
ever existed, in which Europe can have it all. Europe’s ability to shape a common, 
coherent strategy that it can follow in the years ahead will depend on its ability to 
face choices that do not just make strategic sense but also address tensions between 
its different interests.
Firstly, a global strategy will have to acknowledge that there will be tensions be-
tween normative, economic and security interests in each of the regions with which 
Europe engages. Europe has to co-operate with undemocratic regimes in the fields 
of energy, trade and security, and as power shifts away from the West, we can no 
longer assume we will have the leverage to demand political reform of all of our 
partners. But unless it is prepared to abandon its role as a normative actor, there 
will be difficult choices between European values such as democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law and economic interests such as market access and investment 
– at least in the short term. The aim of a European strategy is precisely to make it 
easier for Europe to make these short-term choices in a smart way.
Secondly, geography and history mean that there are tensions between the national 
interests of different EU member states. Decisions about how to prioritise between 
3  On France’s “strategic stake” in Asia, see Le Drian (2013).
4  For a longer discussion of such an eventuality, see Gowan and Kundnani (2014).
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these national interests will not be easy, but they will need to be taken. Part of the 
answer may be for different member states to take more or less responsibility for 
different regions, but there is also a danger that member states could use such “spe-
cial relationships” to pursue their own national interests rather than the European 
interest5. There are also resource implications: France’s intervention in Mali in 2013 
was generally held to be in the European interest, but other member states did not 
offer resources to support it. Any European strategy must therefore go further in 
defining the relationship between member states’ national interests and the Euro-
pean interest.
Thirdly, and connected to the different national interests that member states have, 
there will be tensions between the various different regions in which Europe en-
gages and the different roles it aspires to play in the world: some Europeans think 
globally, others think locally; some look east, others look south; some are Atlanti-
cist, others are less so. There is a tendency to think that European interests around 
the world are complementary. A good example is paper published in May 2013 by 
four European think tanks at the behest of the Italian, Polish, Spanish and Swedish 
foreign ministries. It urged Europeans to focus on the “strategic neighbourhood”, 
which would in turn be the basis for global influence and strengthen the Tran-
satlantic relationship (The European Global Strategy, 2013). In practice, however, 
there may be tensions and possibly trade-offs between Europe’s roles as a regional 
power, a global power and a transatlantic partner. 
These tensions are part of the reason why some Europeans – in particular the E3 
– are reluctant to prefer to focus on agreeing concrete deliverables. These member 
states worry that a broader Europe-wide discussion about grand strategy would be 
protracted and pointless. But it is precisely because of the tensions between diffe-
rent member state interests that it is necessary to agree a strategy. In particular, it is 
in the interests of France and the UK to engage in a broader debate about strategy 
because it is the only way to stop other less ambitious member states free riding. 
The alternative is for them to continue to pay for European security themselves – 
which, however, they cannot afford to. The dilemma was illustrated by President 
François Hollande’s somewhat desperate call at the end of last year for a defence 
fund to pay for military interventions such as those undertaken by France in Mali 
and the Central African Republic (Carnegy, 2013).
“Strategic Partnerships” and Democracy
One striking illustration of Europe’s lack of strategic coherence and in particular of 
its tendency to avoid making such difficult choices is the concept of “strategic part-
5  See for example Kundnani and Parello-Plesner (2012).
Nação e Defesa 40
Hans Kundnani
nerships” – the EU’s key conceptual framework for its relations with the leading 
powers of the twenty-first century. As Thomas Renard showed in a report that was 
published in 2011, there has been an inflationary and ad hoc use of the term since 
it was first applied to Russia in 1998 (Renard, 2011). The EU now calls 10 countries 
around the world – Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Afri-
ca, South Korea and the United States – “strategic partners”. But, as Renard and 
others have pointed out, there is a complete absence of strategic rationale behind 
the use of the concept.
In particular, there is little logic to the choice of the 10 countries designated as “stra-
tegic partners” and no definition of what a “strategic partnership” is. Some Euro-
pean policymakers have suggested that a “strategic partner” is simply a country 
that has the power to damage Europe’s interests – and with whom it therefore has 
no choice but to engage. But there is little logic to the list of the EU’s 10 “strategic 
partners” even in this minimal sense. After all, some of the countries that Euro-
peans worry most about – Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Ukraine – are missing from the 
list. Others have suggested that “strategic partners” are those with whom Europe 
co-operates in relation to third countries. But only the US really fits into this cate-
gory. In short, the EU’s “strategic partnerships” are not very strategic.
In particular, it is unclear what role, if any, shared values are meant to play in the 
EU’s “strategic partnerships”. Since the revolutions in North Africa last year, Eu-
ropeans have talked a lot about getting on the right side of history. For decades, 
European leaders had cozy relationships with autocratic rulers in the region such 
as Zine el-Abidine Ben-Ali and Hosni Mubarak, which were justified in the name 
of stability. But the Arab revolutions forced Europe to rethink this realist approach 
based on the idea that stability and reform in the Arab world were opposing princi-
ples. The European Union is now committed to supporting democratic transitions 
in post-revolutionary North Africa on the principle of “more for more”. However, 
there is little evidence that Europe is applying the lesson of the Arab revolutions 
in its other relationships and in particular in its “strategic partnerships” with non-
democratic countries such as China.
It is hard to see how it is possible to have a real “strategic” relationship – in other 
words, a comprehensive, long-term relationship that involves co-operation in sol-
ving regional and global challenges and in particular on strategic issues – without 
some shared values. This, for example, is the basis of the relationship the EU has 
with the US – in many ways its only real “strategic partner”. It may also be possible 
to develop real strategic partnerships with other democracies such as Brazil, India 
and Japan. But among the EU’s 10 “strategic partners” are also authoritarian states 
such as China and Russia. This terminology suggests that our relationship with 




Many Europeans like to think of the EU as a “normative power”. This term is based 
largely on the model of enlargement, through which the EU sought to transform 
applicant countries in central and south-eastern Europe and in the process spread 
its norms – for a long time, the only foreign policy that the EU had. But while some 
argue that the EU is in effect too normative in its neighbourhood, it does not seem 
to follow this transformative, values-based approach at all in its foreign policy in 
general and in its strategic partnerships in particular6. European leaders often say 
that, as Herman Van Rompuy recently put it, “history is on the side of democracy” 
(Van Rompuy, 2012). But our actions beyond the neighbourhood suggest that we 
don’t really believe that promoting our values is in our long-term interests. If any-
thing is to remain of the EU’s idea of a values-based foreign policy, the EU must 
apply its normative approach to its “strategic partnerships” by including democra-
cy in the way they are defined.
In particular, “strategic partnerships” – as opposed to tactical partnerships – must 
surely involve some degree of strategic trust. An alliance or security communi-
ty is impossible without strategic trust, which is usually based on shared values. 
A “strategic partnership” is not an alliance. But if the term is to mean anything at 
all, it must be thought of as something between a formal alliance and the kind of 
ad hoc, anti-ideological engagement that all powers have to undertake with hostile 
or difficult powers regardless of whether or not they share values. In other words, 
a “strategic partnership” must be based on some degree of strategic trust, which it 
is hard – and perhaps impossible – to develop with an authoritarian state. China is 
perhaps the best example of this: is it possible to have a real “strategic partnership” 
with a country to which one cannot sell weapons?
Robert Kagan has suggested the idea of a “league of democracies” as a way of 
showing commitment to the democratic idea and “a means of pooling the resources 
of democratic nations to address a number of issues that cannot be addressed at the 
United Nations and eventually providing legitimacy for actions that democratic 
nations agree are legitimate7. The idea is associated with Senator John McCain, who 
endorsed it in the 2008 presidential campaign, although it has also been supported 
by liberal figures such as Princeton professor and former State Department head of 
policy planning Anne-Marie Slaughter and current US ambassador to NATO Ivo 
Daalder. However, it may be too crude an approach that could undermine the Uni-
ted Nations – despite Kagan’s insistence that it would “complement, not replace” 
the UN and other existing organizations (Kagan, 2008a: 97).
The EU should therefore explore other ways of distinguishing in its foreign policy 
between democracies and non-democracies. It should distinguish, in substance and 
6  See for example Leonard (2011).
7  See for example Kagan (2008b).
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ideally also in name, between three types of “strategic partner”: first, real strategic 
partners such as the US and other NATO countries; second, democratic countries 
such as Brazil and India with whom a real strategic partnership could and should 
be developed; and third, non-democracies such as China, with whom we must ne-
vertheless engage and co-operate. In practice, given that it would hardly be smart 
for the EU to downgrade its relationship with China, that means somehow upgra-
ding its relationships with other countries with whom Europe believe we share 
values and in particular emerging democratic powers – above all, given their size 
and geopolitical significance, Brazil and India. 
Conversely, if anything remains of the EU’s aspiration to be a “normative power”, 
there is a need to think about how to promote values with authoritarian powers 
such as China on whom Europeans are increasingly dependent for economic grow-
th. Europe’s approach to values is increasingly declaratory. For example, human 
rights dialogues with China are increasingly pointless processes that achieve little 
in practice and alienate the Chinese. But, instead of thinking creatively about al-
ternative approaches, many European policymakers seem increasingly inclined to 
abandon the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law altogether. 
Instead, they simply hope that economic integration will gradually but automati-
cally produce democratization – despite the apparent resilience of China’s autho-
ritarian model. One alternative approach may be to co-operate more closely with 
democracies in Asia such as India and Japan on policy towards China.
Conclusion
In addition to the concrete steps on European defence co-operation agreed in 
December, the European Council also invited the High Representative, “in close 
cooperation with the Commission, to assess the impact of changes in the global 
environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges 
and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with the Member 
States” (European Council, 2013). Although the wording fell short of what some 
had hoped for, this one sentence in the Council conclusions could be an important 
first step towards the development of an updated European global strategy. Since 
Catherine Ashton’s five-year term as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy will come to an end at the end of 2014, it will be for her successor 
to produce and present this assessment of “changes in the global environment”. 
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